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IN 'IHE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
;\. RCLON JACKSON,
)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
) 10389
1

GRANT R. CALDWELL, LEON
H. JACKSON, LOYD J. CA~IP
BELL an<l LO,VELL D. :NIELSON, Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF

The Appellant, by and through his counsel of
record, respectfully moves the court for a rehearing
11 ith respect to the opinion and decision filed by the
1
' 1tll't on June 21, 1966, on the grounds and for the
reasons as follows:
1

1.
niid

The court apparently has overlooked relevant

deeisi, e facts an<l authorities duly submitted by

1

counsel and not referred to or disposed of in th . .
• •
e op1111u:1
and decision of the court.

A. The court apparently overlooked tli 1
e '']'
pellant's point regarding the undisputed fact liJ:,· ~
clients or accounts of public accountants ma\' 1, :
sold to other accountants; that in the industry ·thn
are marketable.
·
B. The court overlooked the Appellant's poi 11;
that the record demonstrated without dispute that
the defendants appropriated to themselves tlit
relevant clients of the partnership prior to plain
tiffs' exclusion.
C. The court did not pass upon Appellanl1
point that he was entitled to credit for work iu
progress based upon the relative investment in
such asset made by the firm prior to the date o!
dissolution.
2. Analysis and consideration of the points :1111i
authorities submitted by the Appellant overlooked 11!
the court would necessarily reqmre a different resuli
than that reached.
I

3. The unusual circumstances denied Appellant :

his right to a determination by a five-judge court. Ju' .
tice Crockett disqualified himself prior to oral arg !
ment: Justice '"' ade died before the case was decideil
Justice I-Ienroid did not participate in the rlecisinn
Thus a combination of circumstances beyond Apve: i
lant's control and indeed beyond anyone's coutro] ri..
11

2

~l j

lted in a situation where the case was decided by a

three-judge panel. Only two members of the panel were
regular justices of this court. In addition to the con,titutional issue, Appellant suggests that these circumstances denied him plenary, vigorous consideration
,,j' fire independent justices.
WHEREFORE, Appellant respectfully prays
tl 1at the court make and enter an order granting to
Appellant a rehearing and that the opinion filed by
this court in the above entitled case on June 21, 196()
be withdrawn and that the court file an opinion analyzing and disposing of the issues raised by the Appellant
on this appeal.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I

THE COURT I-IAS RULED THAT IT 'VILL
A REHEARING YVHERE THE
ORIGINAL OPINION HAS NOT CONSIDERED A POINT 'VHICH 'VOULD CALL
FOR A DIFFERENT RESULT AND 'VHERE
SIGNIFICANT FACTS AND POINTS OF
LAW HA\TE BEEN OVERLOOKED.
(~RANT

iliat

Although the Supreme Court of Utah has held
it will not grant a rehearing to change unsatis3

factory parts of an opinon, even where the parties lia'.
so stipulated, Beaver County v. Home Indemnity Cr
(1935) 88 Ut. l, 52 P. (2d) 435, where no matenli
fact or principal of law has
been disregarded, Adrun .
•

v. Portage Irr., Reservoir & Potver Co. (1938), \I.',

·:

I

I
I

I

Ut. 20, 81 P. (2d) 368, or where an opinion mad, :
corrected without changing the result, Salt Lake .Ci1
v. Telluride Power Co. (1933) 82 Ut. 622, 26 P.(2<li
822, the court has stated that it will grant a rehearinrr
where it has not satisfied constitutional or statutor)
requirements or where the original opinion fails to co11·
sider a point raised on appeal which could call for a
different result. Fenstermaker v. Tribune Publishi1u1
Co. (1896), 13 Ut. 532, 45 P. 1097. The rule of
Adams v. Porta,qe, supra, indicates that a rehearing
should be granted when material facts have been ayer·
looked.
11

•

~

Petitioner respectfully submits that the original
opinion overlooked decisive material facts and respect·
fully requests the court to reconsider this case in the
context of these facts which constituted the primar:
grounds upon which the appeal was predicated.

POINT II.

THE OPINION OF THE COURT FAILED
TO CONSIDER THR UNDISPUTED FJC'l
THAT UNDER CURRENT I N D U S 'f Ry .
PRACTICE, NATIONAL AND LOCAL. CL!:
4

EXTS OR ACCOUNTS OF PUBLIC ACcoCNTAN'l'S .MA y BE SOLD TO OTHER
,\CCOUN'l'ANTS.
The opinion of the court adopts the rule of 40
Am. J ur., Partnerships, Sec. 271, p. 316, to the effect
that professional partnerships have no good will which
may be distributed as a firm asset upon distribution.
This <lecision appears to have been reached because
}lessina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. did not carry good
will on their books as an asset, did not characterize
goo(l will as such in the partnership agreement, and
failed to refer to good will in the provisions relating
to distribution of firm assets upon dissolution.
These conclusions overlook the uncontradicted facts
in the record showing that current practices in the public accountant industry not only recognize the sale of
accounts, but that the industry has actually worked out
and applied regular formulae for valuin~ accounts.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-18; Appellant's Reply
llrief, pp. 3-11). The record is undisputed that in the
industry a value is placed upon a practice separate
and apart from the physical assets and so-called book
rnlue amounts of the firm. (R. 344-346, 356-358, 349383; cf. the testimony of defendants' witnesses R. 561.566; see Appellant's Brief pp. 18-19; Appellant's
Reply Brief, pp. 3-11). The record shows that the
accounts of :Messina, .Jackson, Caldwell and Co. were
\\']thin this general rule and could have been sold at
:mr time relevant to this inquiry.

5

The opinion overlooks the uncontradicted far·i· :
with respect to the salability of these accounts, ' not \\'!·11 I· '
standing the Appellant's direct argument that failuri· i
of the trial court to reckon with them required revers:ii.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-19, Appellant's Reply Briel.
pp. 3-11).
'
This court has held consistently that a trier of fad,
may not arbitrarily ignore uncontradicted credible
evidence. De Vas v. Nob le ( 1962) 13 Ut.2d) 19.J,
396 P. (2d) 290; Arnold Machinery Co. v. Intrusi01,
PrePa.kt Inc., (1961), 11 Ut.(2d) 246, 357 P.l2d
-~96; Jensen v. Logan City (1939) 96 Ut. 522, 88 P.
( 2d) 459. Since this just rule governs the finder o!
fact, Appellant respectfully submits that it should be
enforced by this court in the formula tion of its own
decisions. The court should grant the petition for re·
hearing to reconsider the opinion in view of the materini
facts overlooked in the opinion of June 21, 1966.
I

1

POINT III.
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS IT·
SELF TO THE APPELLANT'S POINT THAT
UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE DEMONSTRAT·
ED CLEARLY THAT DEFENDANTS AP· '
PROPRIATED THE GOOD WILL OF THE
FIRlVI BEFORE NOTIFYING THE PLA!X· i
TIFF OF HIS EXCLUSION FROM THI.

I

l~IRlVI.

6

Iu its opinion, the court stated that the record dis-

elosed no solicitation of accounts on the part of the
rlefendants; that defendant Caldwell accounted to the
plaintiff, and that the plaintiff did solicit.
Examination of the record shows that such findings could only be made if the court overlooked the
significance of relevant dates. The confusion surrounding the dates is clearly demonstrated in Respondents'
Reply Brief, pp. 12-16. The trial court repeatedly
asked for clarification of the time sequence and received
confusing responses from defendant Caldwell.
The defendant Caldwell became a general partner
in the firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. on
April I, 1955. On April l, 1958 a new partnership
agreement was executed. This was amended April l,
1959 by providing for continuation of the firm for two
fiscal years after the death of any partner with provision for payouts. On August 19, 1959, Marco Messina
died. In March, 1960 an agreement was executed
between plaintiff and defendants (Exhibit 5) which
reaffirmed the intention of the parties to continue the
partnership after the payout of the Messina estate.
Suddenly, early in 1961, the defendants informed plaintiff that he was being thrown out of the firm as of
March 31, 1962. Formal notice to this effect was given
on April 2, 1961.
The court stated that the plaintiff solicited act'rHmts before dissolution while the defendants did not.
,\ppellant insists that there is no evidence he ever
7

solicited accounts at any time. In any event ' <lef'· ci H1a1tf
have never claimed there was any solicitation b,, l ·
. ,
.
.
.
, fl Ui11
tiff until after he was advised that he was being tli ro1111
out of the firm which he had devoted 20 years of Iii,
life to building. The undisputed and indisputable fae:
is that the notice of termination of April 3, 1961 \'Ill!·
stituted a breach of the contract of March 5, l9liO 111
that it was a repudiation by defendants of their promi,c
to renew and continue the partnership relationship
The plaintiff had a positive duty to mitigate darnagci
But even more important than the legal point
involving the right and duty to mitigate damages 11en
defendants' admissions as to the facts. Defendanh
conceded that before the plaintiff was given any notict
of their intention of evicting him, they had alread1
satisfied themselves that they could hold the bulk of the
firm's accounts, whether the plaintiff solicited or not.
(See the detailed argument in Appellant's Brief, pp 1
24-31). And, as pointed out in Point IV of AppellanL
Reply Brief, pp. 11-16, the fact that the defendant'..
had appropriated to themselves the good will of tlit
firm before excluding the plaintiff could not properh I
be ignored by the trial court. See Smith v. B1ill (19.18 i
50 Cal. ( 2d) 294, 325 P. ( 2d) 463. The record ~]earh ;
shows the defendants admitted on cross-exammat1111: I
that they were sure they had secured the one asset moi i
valuabl~ to professional practice-the substantial dieiit
-before notifying the plaintiff that his relatinnsh:i i
was terminated. (R. 228-229, et seq.) The office rn:1 !
1'

I

i

1
'

8

·ioer

of the firm admitted conversations where this con-

'"
clusion was reached. ( R. 234, 238, 240-242, 246-247) .
bearing on this point, the court stated that
the plaintiff established a business relationship with
)Ir. Paul Maxwell in January, 1962, three months
before the dissolution of the old firm. The opinion relates
that Maxwell immediately left the firm and took certain clients and accounts and their records with him,
and that the business relationship was merely formalized in May, 1962. As this too appears to be a
ground for imputing scienter to the plaintiff, it is
re.1pectfu1ly pointed out that the court overlooks the
time sequence. (Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 16, R.
J;i~). The record is without contradiction that plaintiff
took no action with respect to moving elsewhere or
forming any other association until many months after
he was notified by defendants that his relationship with
them was terminated. Before they gave him such notice,
defendants admit that they satisfied themselves that
they could hold the clients.
r~lso

Appellant respectfully submits that these om1sswns of fact are material and justify reconsideration
b)· the court.

POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT PASS UPON THE
(~l'RSTION AS TO 'VHETHER THE PLAINTIFF
i\S ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR

"r

9

'¥ORK IN PROGRESS BASED UPON Tm: .
RELATIVE INVEST~IENT IN SUCH ASSEt
l\IADE BY THE FIRM PRIOR TO THE DX!l ;
OF DISSOLUTION OF THE FIRM.

f

1

The opinion states that the Appellant's first foui
points may be combined into one inclusive questiui, •
The Appellant respectfully submits that bis Point !\"
relating to equitable division of the asset referred lri i
as work in progress is separate and distinct from t1 1r !
first three points, which involve the issue of the tirm 1 '.
good will and its appropriation by the defendant\ !
Petitioner respectfully requests the court to reconsi1le1 /
this point raised on appeal and overlooked in the opinio11 i
of June 21, 1966.
!

1

POINT

v.

I

I

I

THE ANAMOLOUS CONSTRUCTIOX OF
THE COURT RENDERING THE DEClSIO~ l
JUSTIFIES A RECONSIDERATION OF TllI
CASE BY A FULL COURT.
I

i

Prior to oral argument of the case, Justice Crockc\! :
disqualified himself. Judge Nelson was designate°. I' I
act as a fifth member of the court for the considera!tm ,
of the case. It appears from the opinion that Ji;itw i
Henroid did not participate in the decision. 'fhe reconl !
of the court indicate that before the decision wai reii ·
dered, Justice Wade died. Apparently he did ~' 1
participate in the decision. Appellant's counsel h •'

10

11

)cd that there are many instances where the opnuou

uf one of the justices of this court is so persuasive that,
while it is first offered as a dissenting opinion, it becomes
the considered view of the majority. Consideration of
cases by five justices on appeal is for the clear and
unmistakable purpose of exposing the Appellant's arguments to the diversified views and experiences of five
independent members of the court. In this case, through
nobody's fault, but as a result of the circumstances
which developed between the time of argument and the
rendering of the decision, the arguments made by the
Appellant were not considered by five or even four
members of the court. Aside from the issues arising
under the state Constitution, therefore, Appellant suggests that the unusual circumstances justify reconsideration of the case by a full court.

Article VIII, Section 2 of the state constitution
provides:
"A majority of the judges constituting the
court shall be necessary to form a quorum or
render a decision."
l'his is not a case like In Re 'l. 1hompson Estate (1927)
iH't. 17, 269 P. 103, where the court held that a petitioner was estopped from arguing that the court was
irregularly constituted. In that case the petitioner had
made his arguments to a court consisting of four regular
. .iustil·es awl one district judge; he raised the question
fur the first time after a decision was reached. State
'· Gro1 er (1942) 102 Ut. 459, 132 P. (2d) 125 holds
1

11

that a justice on leave, having heard the ...
<11 guintl'
could render a decisive ( 3-2) vote. N ezJhi Ir..1 .
1
•
.
1,q11l101, .
lo. v. Jenkins (1893) 8 Ut. 452, 32 P. 699 ' Jioll(,\ \11·1. I
a non-participating ' justice could sit and be ,.dll1!1f:I
'
1 1
toward constituting a quorum. None of tliesc tR\t•
, .·
appears to preclude a construction of the Coustitutiin.
to the effect that at least three regular members,,
the court are necessary to render a decision. Jn tnr
instant case, only two regular justices of the eourt par
ticipated. It is arguable that since the decision in ti,.
instant case was rendered by only two justices, un1],
Article VIII, Section 2 it is not a final decisio1111f ti:
court.
1

Even more persuasive than the legalistic arg1:
ment, however, is the experience which all adrnca\1,
have had in presentation of an issue to five as 1li,
tinguished from three or any less number of Yirilt I
active mi1:ds. J?issent' 'necessarily stirs further i~quir: 1
and cons1dera ti on. I he loss of the opporturnty r: 11
present a closely contested question to less than \1 i
number required by law in a given situation represP1 11 !
the loss of a very valuable right in a practical 'eiH !
The books abound with cases where new trials u•:
granted because one member of a jury is found ti, lia· i
been disqualified or was improperly permitted to 1en"
It is submitted that a similar rule has an apprupri:d
application in the instant case where only two off, :
· ·
··
d m
· t h e case am l the e11\lir
regular Justices
participate
· l
1
panel consisted of only three judges.
1

1

12

'fhe point has particular significance in this
ca\e. The plaintiff here admittedly was incapacitated
3 ~ a 1ritness. Defendant Caldwell testified at great .
length with respect to conversations allegedly occurring
lJetll'een him and the plaintiff after plaintiff was notified
1Jiat the partnership relationship was terminated . .Mr.
Caldwell could not have been unaware that his testimony purporting to reflect conversations with plaintiff
could not be challenged directly. It is particularly
important in the instant case therefore that the issues
he evaluated in the light of the facts which could not
be disputed. One of these facts related to relev:mt
industry practices. Another involved conversations and
cirrnmstances to which the defendants admitted. The
discovery procedures which led to these admissions
are immaterial; the admissions themselves are the significant and controlling factors. It is reasonable to
believe that tfre independent members of the court might
hm probed more deeply into the evidence to more fully
analyzr Appellant's arguments with respect to the undisputed realities of the situation.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons given in this Petition, most of which
:ire more fully discussed in Appellant's Brief and Appellant's lleply Brief, plaintiff submits that a new hearitig should he awarded before a fully constituted court
'if fi1e ju.~tices. Petitioner suggests that the Honorable

13

R. L. Tuckett, newly appointed member of tlie cuii: 1
might properly consider the case with the other rn~ 1 , ,
hers of the court.

RESPECTFULLY SUll~IITTED ti' , ,
- .-',11~ N
day of July, 1966.
t;.,;t
_
1i,..., -v ));. ),,-i·, /);i_ccc~~ ,
GEORGE M. McMILLAX',,, i
1

!,.

I

1020 Kearns Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appella11i :

!
I
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